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General Hospital and educational programs like the
Theological Schools’ Committee on Clinical Training,
Myers tracks the formal routes of this pastoral work and
its predominance among liberal Protestants. By 1965
the American Association of Pastoral Counselors
(AAPC) formed, signaling the abundant course offer-
ings and degree programs available to produce profes-
sional counselors with theological investments. Yet in
the same year that the AAPC was inaugurated, Fuller
Theological Seminary established a School of Psychol-
ogy, a follow-up to the 1950s organization of the Chris-
tian Association for Psychological Studies. As liberal
Protestants started to look more secular than liberal to
some critics, evangelicals reacted with organizational
fervor, working to create a counseling subculture that
emphasized biblical moral standards and God’s neces-
sary presence in any transformation of the self. Since
she focuses on liberal religious figures, Myers-Shirk
misses an opportunity to underline this important mo-
ment of Christian schism and rebuttal. Nevertheless,
through her lucid descriptions and sensitivity to her
subject matter, she offers a significant historical de-
scription of contemporary therapeutic presumption.
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During the past fifteen years historians have re-exam-
ined the field of inter-American relations and, engaging
with the cultural turn, have increasingly paid attention
to the “soft” factors in these relations. Ursula Prutsch’s
book is a welcome addition to the field and a veritable
tour de force. A plethora of U.S. initiatives—involving
not only the government, but also civil society—were
created to tighten relations with Latin America under
the Good Neighbor Policy during the 1940s. The
United States wished to win the hearts and minds of
Latin Americans as it faced the Nazi threat; further-
more, economic and military motives, such as gaining
access to and increasing the production of raw materials
as well as creating markets for U.S. products, also
shaped policy. For her study Prutsch focuses on the Of-
fice of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA), led by business
magnate Nelson A. Rockefeller, which she considers
“the missing link” in analyses of the Good Neighbor
Policy.
Prutsch approaches her subject in three parts. She
first details the workings of the OIAA in general, dis-
cussing its relations with the State Department and its
complex entanglements with other wartime agencies as
well as professional and academic organizations. The
author pays close attention to the OIAA’s ties with the
business world and emphasizes its role in garnering cru-
cial economic information, including that involving the
affairs of people on the controversial blacklists of “axis
supporters.” Prutsch then lays out the organization’s
activities in the field of press relations, details film cam-
paigns (including, but not limited to, the works of Dis-
ney), and examines radio politics and other attempts to
reach the masses in Latin America.
The next two sections of the book explore the OIAA’s
activities in Brazil and Argentina more closely, and it
is here that Prutsch’s contribution is particularly strong;
drawing on considerable secondary sources and several
archives in these countries, she brings their cultural
spheres to life. Prutsch details covertly financed lecture
tours and serves up a wealth of information on radio
and film propaganda. Some of these subjects have been
examined before (Carmen Miranda, for instance, or the
Brazil Builds traveling exhibition), but others have so
far remained obscure in this multiverse of initiatives.
Prutsch also does an excellent job of giving the reader
a sense of the people involved in these projects through
concise biographies that make clear the extent to which
the academy, business, and philanthropy were tightly
interwoven and the ways in which a person could move
through these institutions rather quickly. The few pages
on Maria Rosa Oliver, an Argentine OIAA collabora-
tor, take us from the 1930s to the 1950s and also chron-
icle her disenchantment with U.S. policy.
The OIAA seems to have been—out of necessity at
a time of war—more self-reflective and at times critical
of its own efforts than one would expect, so that even
sections that rely mostly on OIAA material give a sense
of the limits and problems involved in “creating good
neighbors,” abounding in examples of mutual misun-
derstandings and the patronizing attitudes of the Amer-
icans. But given Rockefeller’s strong sense of his own
importance as well as that of “his” agency, it is perhaps
not surprising that Prutsch also tends to overstate the
OIAA’s role at times. While she acknowledges the
other agencies active in inter-American relations, some
of them long before the OIAA (most notably the Pan-
American Union and the Cultural Affairs Division of
the State Department), the relations are not always
clear. The programs relating to mass media seem to
have been developed squarely within the OIAA, but the
relationship of the OIAA to other initiatives like the
Brazilian-American Food Production Commission is
much less evident. Of course, the nearly impossible task
of teasing out the tangle of overlapping wartime agen-
cies is a historian’s nightmare, which manifests itself in
the text in frequent expressions like “under the aegis of
the OIAA and other institutions” (p. 290).
Prutsch’s assessment of the OIAA efforts is mixed.
The alliance with the business sector gave U.S. policy
a better reach, but especially in the field of mass media
it led to the perpetuation of stereotypes that both sides
had hoped to reduce. Even though American policies
were much less successful in Argentina than in Brazil,
they still led to much accumulation of knowledge on
both sides and the creation of networks of professionals
and intellectuals that remained beyond the dissolution
of the OIAA. Moreover, Prutsch shows nicely that Bra-
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zil in particular was able to use U.S. resources for the
affirmation of its own cultural identity. As for the eco-
nomic policies the OIAA supported, the author cor-
rectly remarks that the “development paradigm” (p.
195) was already in operation during the war, but can
we really ascribe its rise solely to the OIAA? Such issues
of interpretation notwithstanding, Prutsch has pro-
duced an outstanding book, a great resource for any
student of inter-American relations and one that
should be translated to gain a greater audience in Latin
America and the United States.
CORINNE A. PERNET
University of St. Gallen
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In undertaking the research for this monograph, Mi-
chael Grow set out to explore the economic and na-
tional security concerns that led the United States to
intervene repeatedly in Latin America during the Cold
War. After reviewing the evidence, however, he con-
cluded that the traditional framework had to be jetti-
soned in favor of one that emphasized the role of Latin
American actors, U.S. domestic politics, and, above all,
U.S. credibility. Through eight tightly argued case stud-
ies (Guatemala, Cuba, British Guiana, Dominican Re-
public, Chile, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Panama), Grow
refutes both the realist and revisionist schools of inter-
pretation, which have insisted that anticommunism and
U.S. corporate interests lay at the root of U.S. inter-
ventionism in Latin America during the Cold War. In-
stead, he argues, scholars need to grapple with why so
many U.S. presidents felt trapped into launching mil-
itary interventions to save their domestic reputations
and to prove to the world, as the elder George Bush
once put it, that “what we say goes.”
Grow is careful to explain at the outset that he does
not intend to describe U.S. military interventions in
Latin America, or to explore the aftermath of those in-
terventions, or even Latin American reactions to them.
The focus on high-level U.S. decision making undoubt-
edly facilitated the inclusion of so many cases studies,
the details of which might have otherwise overwhelmed
the reader. Although this study is not based on archival
research, the author does demonstrate strong familiar-
ity with the historical literature surrounding each in-
tervention, and he clearly has a knack for employing
colorful quotations to prove his points. Henry Kiss-
inger, we learn, “never gave a shit about the business
community” (p. 100); and President Lyndon Johnson
wondered, “What can we do in Vietnam if we can’t
clean up the Dominican Republic?” (p. 89).
Studies of this kind are designed to be provocative,
and Grow’s will certainly invite criticism. One problem
is that the historical record for U.S. interventions oc-
curring after the Nixon presidency is incomplete due to
long delays in the declassification process. It also seems
curious that the author did not try to link U.S. moti-
vations to the chosen instrument of intervention. If the
purpose of intervening in Latin America was to dem-
onstrate American credibility to the world, then why did
Washington rely on covert action so often (five out of
eight interventions)? At times, Grow seems to overstate
his case. The insistence that Latin American actors
played a “pivotal” role in fomenting interventions over-
looks the fact that coup plotters red-baited their ene-
mies so frequently that many U.S. analysts learned to
discount their opinions. The contention that domestic
political considerations “virtually forced Kennedy to
pursue an interventionist policy” in Cuba (p. 53) ap-
pears exaggerated, as does the claim that reports from
one of Richard Nixon’s close personal friends were the
“decisive” reason behind his decision to intervene in
Chile (p. 194).
Given Grow’s willingness to transcend traditional
categories of analysis, it is surprising that he failed to
incorporate race and gender into his explanation for
U.S. interventions in Latin America. Scholars such as
Frank Costigliola have emphasized the importance of
language in the study of U.S. foreign relations, and
Grow’s subject matter would appear to invite such an
application. This omission reflects a more general fail-
ure to situate the analysis in the context of U.S. hege-
mony and empire. After all, the issue of credibility begs
the question: if military interventions were meant to
signal to foreign governments that the United States
would not tolerate challenges to its interests, then what
were those interests, and why should they not count in
an assessment of U.S. motivations for intervention?
The self-imposed confines of Grow’s study do not per-
mit an exploration of the meaning of intervention that
takes into account the kinds of regimes that Washing-
ton installed after it deposed a government. For exam-
ple, is it a mere coincidence that U.S. investment soared
in Guatemala after the Eisenhower administration de-
posed Jacobo Arbenz? Was it merely an oddity of his-
tory that Chile became the laboratory for neoliberalism
after Augusto Pinochet deposed Salvador Allende with
Washington’s blessings? Grow insists, with good rea-
son, that individual U.S. economic interests did not
control American foreign policy. But he fails to con-
sider that, ever since the Open Door policy of 1899, the
U.S. State Department has been preconditioned to
evaluate regimes on their willingness to accommodate
free trade and foreign investment, or what the historian
Emily Rosenberg has called “liberal developmental-
ism.”
Perhaps it is to Grow’s credit that he did not try to
grapple with these complexities or try to provide some
sort of grand model with hierarchical explanations. His
greatest contribution has been to help scholars recon-
sider the role of credibility in elite decision making,
thereby rising to the challenge raised nearly two de-
cades ago by Robert McMahon in his Stuart L. Bernath
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